/395 cont./

105 *631 II. The large commands of the Atlas. -- The conditions under which the power of the chiefs of the Atlas is formed in our time is explained, as we have said, by simple laws; it will suffice for us, /396/ in order to bring them to light, to recall briefly the various stages of their conquest of the tribes.

105 *631 *634 616 At the beginning of the last century, several hundred little republics, united among themselves by two chains of alliances, make up an immense chessboard that covers the greater part of the mountains and thus delimits the region in which the long game, whose stake is the liberty of the Berbères /Berbers/, is going to begin between the assemblies, the amghars, and the Makhzen /makhzan/.

105 *634 578 613 At the outset, in the small canton where equilibrium is realized among the heads of all the large families, of all the "ikhs" that share the benefits of the local government, several ambitious ones appear, who think that their greater strength merits them a larger part of the profits; soon two parties form and confront each other; the winner takes the title of "amghar" and replaces the oligarchy of family heads by the tyranny of a single one.

105 *634 182 619 726 (616) In this minuscule territory of a small tribal fraction, in this "taqbilt" where the domination of one "ikhs" over the others is thus established, the new chief feels the urgent necessity of maintaining the union that he has realized for a moment by internal force by reviving external wars. Thanks to the ancient alliances concluded between the small republics of the country, he easily manages to extend his influence afar, and soon he undertakes to subject a veritable tribe to his will. If he succeeds in defeating the chief of the opposite alliance, he places the enemy "taqbilt" under the yoke of his leff, and with the support of his canton of origin he organizes, in various forms, the exploitation of a tribe by a canton.

105 *634 619 *631 726 If fortune continues to favor the victorious amghar, one then sees him try to subjugate, with the help of contingents that he has raised in the tribe of which he has become the uncontested master, extensive territories in the plains; entire confederations pay tax to

105 /396 cont./
*634 him; he establishes himself on the mountain routes of passage,
619 builds fortresses there of which his ikhs or village "brothers" are
*63 the guardians; his canton "brothers" stay around him permanently
726 in order to constitute his escort; the warriors that he sends afar to subdue rebels are his tribal "brothers."

105 It is when he has reached this degree of power that the
*631 amghar effortlessly takes a place with the Sultan's kaids. Doubt-
*634 less, he /397/ is not yet confused in the ranks of the servile chiefs
648 of tribes of the plains; he preserves the pride of his power, the ar-
182 rogance of having been able to constitute with his own forces the vast command that he exercises. Let even a period of anarchy come, he will free himself as much as possible from the orders of the pashas of the neighboring capital; by his inclinations and his ambitions, the mountain lord finds himself henceforth carried along in the current of the politics of the Makhzen /makhzan/; his attention more and more turns away from the obscure mountain traditions; his eyes are more often cast toward the court of the Sultan or of the pretenders; he burns with the desire to play, close to them, by means of disturbances, the more brilliant and still more profitable role of vizier or governor of towns.

In truth, it is not only at the end of this evolution that the role of the Makhzen appears in the tribes. Indeed, the Sultan, from the depths of his palaces in towns far from the mountains, promotes and encourages at all times, to the border of the regions where his authority is directly exercised, the appearance and the growth of amghars. Under the influence of skillful politics, a tendency hostile to the anarchic government of the assemblies forces its way through in the still-independent communities. The great kaids themselves imitate the ruler, and little by little, in proportion as the pressure of the Makhzen is accentuated or as the powerful chiefs of the Atlas become more enterprising, revolutions become more numerous within the republics of the high valleys, to the profit of the ambitious; on the contrary, however, if anarchy breaks out in the Empire, the casbahs are thrown to the ground and their masters put to flight; the strongest chiefs shut themselves up with all haste in their impregnable agadirs, the "Aït Arbaʿin" resume their meetings; liberty and discord succeed servitude.

/397 cont./

• 105 In periods favorable to the development of the power of the
* 631 chiefs, one thus sees appearing from everywhere, amidst the in-
*634 dependent tribes, amghars who rise above the traditional govern-
182 ment of Berbérie /Barbary/. But, just as plants coming from similar seeds rise to variable heights above the unequally fertile land of the various parts of the mountain that nourishes them, these minor chiefs do not all attain the same degree of development. The majority extend their roots in only one canton and dominate only one valley; rarer are those who are the masters of one tribe; three or four in a century win /398/ the rich irrigated plains and project the shadow of their strength as far as the borders of the Sahara. The land that bears them is itself profound-
[616] ly disturbed by their growth; traditional boundaries of cantons are erased, the mosaic of the leffs, made up of small states knowingly opposed, breaks up and comes apart; finally, the life of the small social units, humble and tenacious vegetation of the high valleys, etiolates and languishes. It is then that the Makhzen
[648] often arrives, which cuts at will these ephemeral plants emerging so rapidly from Berbère /Berber/ soil, as if to harvest the fruit, then plows and turns up as it pleases, for a few years, the poor field of the subjugated tribes.

Whatever their importance may be, all these chiefs of the
[648] Atlas, amghars of cantons or of tribes, great kaids half independent of the Sultan, are inspired by the same principles in the government of their small states.

105 In their external policy, first of all, they adopt a double
* 631 attitude with regard to their subjects as well as for the eyes of
*634 the more powerful chiefs of the vicinity or of the sherifian Makh-
182 zen. To the mountain warriors they pass themselves off as the
554 last defenders of liberty or of local customs; in this way they
648 collect without difficulty the support that the Berbères /Berbers/ always give without measure to those who claim to defend them against outsiders -- Christians or Mussulmans coming from the plains. -- With the great kaids or the Sultan, on the contrary, the amghars willingly take it upon themselves to maintain in order and peace the populations that they have subdued or that they

/398 cont./

•105 protect; they are the ones, they say, who restrain the instincts of
*631 pillage and revolt of the inhabitants of the summits; in the future
*634 they will even be able, if it please God, to lead them by ruse
182 and patience to accept the yoke of submission.
554 The amghars of the Seksawa, whose appearance and growth
648 we have studied, who pass themselves off to their brothers of the high valleys as the protectors of independence, and who besides turn toward the great kaids of Tagontaft and of Bouaboud, offering to make their ambitions triumph as far as into the most remote cantons of the Tichka, have presented themselves in this way for 20 years. This was recently being done for his part by the old ᶜAbd el Malek Mtouggi, who liked to defend with affectation the last, the most inoffensive Berbère /Berber/ traditions, which he had allowed to live, while at the same time /399/ complacently allowing the court of the Makhzen to see the constant efforts his policy had to exert in order to contain the mountain dissidents of the Seksawa.

105 This double attitude is moreover very ancient. We have told
*631 what the restless life of a great lord of the Atlas, whose career
175 seems to us to be like a historical precedent for that of Si el Ma-
554 dani Glawi in the first years of our century, had been in the time of Ibn Khaldoun /ibn-Khaldun/. Did we then not see ᶜAmer Hintati, master of all the Masmoudian tribes, offer to the Mérinides in difficulty, "in order to render service to the dynasty," to bar the road to the former partisans of the "Mahdi," to whom was attributed the resolution to come again to throw down the unclean mosques of the capital? By means of that role, the great sheik of the Hintata became at the same time the veritable king of the South and collected considerable sums as tax. Likewise, five centuries later
[648] the great kaids of the Atlas were proposing to France, in the first days of the Great War, to ensure by their own means the security of the Sous, in order to "render service" to us, while they were jealously closing to our penetration access to their command or to their zone of influence and were hastily consolidating their conquests by building casbahs in the most fertile valleys, whose good lands they were confiscating.

/399 cont./

•105 *631 175 554 648 One can also recall that at the moment of his greatest power ʿAmer Hintati, master of the Deren, cleverly allowed to exist among the Seksawa and the Gedmiwa of the mountains a seat of independence useful to his policy, this same unsubdued territory that still existed recently at the boundary of the states of the Gontafi and of the Mtouggi; the presence of this faraway and inoffensive dissidence thus permitted justifying in the eyes of the masters of Marrakech the attitude of defenders of the Makhzen /makhzan/ taken so willingly by the great chiefs of the mountains.

105 *631 *634 Such complete analogies between the amghars of the time of the Mérinides and the semi-independent kaids of our time suffice to show what permanent necessities are imposed, in every period, on the ephemeral chiefs of the tribes of the Atlas and who, for lack of true traditions, follow the same route in all the proceedings of their policy because they grow under identical circumstances.

105 182 *634 *631 /400/ But it is above all the internal organization of the states conquered by the amghars that enables us to glimpse one of the most constant laws of the history of Berbérie /Barbary/ and to understand one of the principles that preside over the formation of the great commands.

105 182 *634 *631 616 571 This domination of a territory, ceaselessly extended farther, which the chief of a soff in a village of the Atlas succeeds in progressively subjecting to his will, is founded, as we have said, within a canton by the mastery of one "ikhs" over rival "ikhs," by the triumph of one leff over another in a tribe, finally by the exploitation of the resources of a large confederation or of immense territories of the plains by a privileged tribe. But whatever may be the dimension of the states thus formed, they always keep the mark of their origins. It is for the companions from the village from which the amghar came that the commands of defeated populations are reserved; leff ties or the alliance of families from the tribe of origin serve to link together these warriors henceforth in charge of the rudimentary administration of the conquered country; the lasting existence of a faithful group, constituted thanks to the allies from the first days, thus comes to give more

•105 182 *634 *631 616 571 /400 cont./ solidity to the concentric structure of the Berbère /Berber/ state made up of more and more numerous groups successively integrated by force, and which the will of a family, of a clan, and of a leff maintain solidly assembled, until defeat obliges the conquerors to release their hold and let the tribes go back to the original disorder.

000 III. The Berbère /Berber/ kingdoms of North Africa. -- We do not know with enough preciseness the circumstances under which most of the kingdoms and empires of sedentary Berbérie /Barbary/ were constituted to be able to multiply the examples of this "concentric structure" of states founded by conquest. At least the ones whose origins can be studied show us, in spite of the difference of extent of their frontiers, the profound analogy of the laws of their formation and of that of the large commands of the Atlas.

We shall not retell here the stages of the founding of the Almohade Empire in this same region of the Nefis where there was to appear, eight centuries later, the amghar of Tagontaft, whose more modest epic we have studied at such length. One will recollect that, in this federation of five large tribes united in a single faith /401/ to create the kingdom of the "partisans of the unity of God," the two groups of Aghren and Tinmellel, from which came the father and mother of Ibn Toumert /ibn-Tumart/, always kept a privileged rank; a little later, when the mountain populations accepted the new faith and shared the same hopes of conquest, they were attached by a kind of bond of adoption to one of the five fundamental groups of the Masmouda; besides, it was the warriors of the "five tribes" who furnished the war leaders and the preachers destined to officer the contingents rallied, whose efforts resulted in the conquest of the West; finally, after definitive success, this "Almohade nobility," made up of peasants from the high valleys of the Atlas, went to practice governing the towns of North Africa, administering provinces in Spain, founding kingdoms far away.

It was by following the same path, traced by the nature of the Berbère /Berber/ institutions, that at the other extremity of the

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

IV. TRADITIONAL RURAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

[P.44]

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Structurally, the Berber and Arabic-speaking core-areas of rural 171
Morocco hold many features in common. Both areas are characterized by tribal units; both have kinship groupings defined by [611]
common descent in the male line; both have a patriarchy, and resi- [591]
dence of a married couple with the husband's family; both custo- [361]
marily reside in villages if they are sedentary, or in nomadic camps
if they engage in the care of flocks and herds. Both regions profess [771]
the same religion, and have similar religious institutions, associations, and beliefs. The outstanding differences between the Berbers and the Arabic-speaking peoples reside in those social institutions having a political nature, and in the legal systems. In these there is [64]
an almost continuous gradiation from the independent and decentralized Berber republics, through semi-Arabized and Arabized-Berber tribes, to the Bedouin *guich* tribes who were formerly completely involved in supporting an absolute and highly centralized government.

The traditional independence of the Berbers of the *Bled es Siba*, [648]
and the social pattern associated with it, survived until very re- [175]
cently, for the last independent tribes accepted government authority only in 1935. Berber independence in legal matters still continues, [671]
for, although the *dahir Berbere* (the French decree of 1930 giving [648]
Berber customary law equal status with Moslem law) was repealed in 1956, customary law still continues to determine legal process. In other matters the ancient trend towards Arabization continues [177]
and has been slightly accelerated, with groups demonstrating every degree of transition from their traditional pattern to that of the Arabic-speakers of the plains.